

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION**

|                                      |                                     |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>BETTY WEATHERS,</b>               | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
| <b>Plaintiff,</b>                    | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
| <b>v.</b>                            | * <b>CASE NO.: 2:06-cv-0666-WHA</b> |
|                                      | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
| <b>ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, et al.</b> | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |
| <b>Defendants.</b>                   | *                                   |
|                                      | *                                   |

**PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY ALL  
PROCEEDINGS PENDING TRANSFER DECISION BY THE JUDICIAL PANEL  
ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION**

Plaintiff Betty Weathers files this opposition to Lilly's Motion to Stay All Proceedings Pending Transfer Decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and in support states as follows:

Defendant Lilly's Motion to Stay should be denied. Before ruling on Lilly's motion, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction should be resolved by this Court. Lilly cannot justify why the MDL would be in a better position to move forward with an action filed under Alabama law. Whether this case raises issues similar to federal cases which may be transferred to the MDL is not the issue which faces this Court. This Court can, and should, resolve the issue before it rather than shifting the issue to the MDL.

Moreover, Despite Lilly's assertion that both parties will avoid prejudice by having its Motion to Stay granted, the truth is only Lilly will benefit by the continuing and unnecessary delay that is almost certain to occur if this case is transferred to the MDL. As Lilly acknowledges in their brief, the Zyprexa MDL has been ongoing since April 2004. What Lilly fails to point out is that the MDL proceedings have made very

little, if any, progress during that two-year period. The main purpose of an MDL is to coordinate pre-trial discovery and to provide that discovery to lawyers representing clients across the country. However, most of the attorneys appointed by the MDL court to prepare the discovery have resolved their cases and are not actively pursuing discovery. In two years, not a single deposition has been taken by attorneys for plaintiffs.

As a result of using Zyprexa, Plaintiff has suffered the onset of diabetes mellitus, which, as this Court knows, is a severe and potentially deadly disease. In fact, Plaintiff now has a 65% chance of suffering a fatal heart attack or stroke<sup>1</sup> and Plaintiff's overall health is likely to deteriorate as time passes. Any inconvenience that Lilly may face as a result of state-court proceedings pales in comparison to the prejudice that Plaintiff will suffer by the needless delay tactics, such as this Motion to Stay, that Lilly intends to employ throughout this and other proceedings.

Plaintiff, therefore, respectfully urges this Court to enter an Order denying Lilly's Motion to Stay All Proceedings.

## **ARGUMENT**

In its Motion, Defendant Lilly cites several Orders by judges in other federal districts agreeing to stay these cases pending transfer. There are an equal or greater number of federal judges who do not defer the jurisdictional issue to a MDL. For example, in the diet drug litigation, as this Court is keenly aware, Wyeth filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in virtually every case pending transfer to the MDL. The judges in this District did not accede to this built in delay, and instead decided the jurisdictional issue. In *Sandra Cash v. Wyeth*, this Court rejected the notion that it should allow the

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.diabetes.org/type-2-diabetes/well-being/heart-disease-and-stroke.jsp>

MDL to resolve the jurisdictional issue, stating “[t]he question of whether [the sales representative] was negligent or made fraudulent statements is specific to this case. The MDL court would not be in a better position to decide remand than this court.” *See Sandra Cash v. Wyeth*, CV-03-RRA-3378-E.

Just recently, United States District Judge William Steele denied Lilly’s Motions to Stay and remanded five Zyprexa® cases filed in various circuit courts encompassed by the Southern District. Lilly unsuccessfully alleged fraudulent joinder as a means to disregard the citizenship of the in-state defendants. Judge Steele flatly rejected Lilly’s contention that judicial economy would be served by allowing the MDL court to decide the merits of the jurisdictional issues, and sharply criticized the “reflexive rule that automatically defers decision to an MDL court whenever it can be predicted that an issue at least superficially may arise in other transferred cases.” *Betts v. Eli Lilly and Company, et al.*, Case No. 06-0259-WS-B (S.D. Ala. June 5, 2006)<sup>2</sup>.

Further, Eleventh Circuit precedent requires the federal court to promptly determine issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Consistent with the principles of judicial economy, issues of subject matter jurisdiction should be resolved prior to any transfer to a MDL.

**A.     *Eleventh Circuit case law requires that this Court rule on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand prior to addressing any other motions, including a request to stay proceedings.***

This Court is under a duty to examine its own jurisdiction prior to undertaking any action. *University of South Ala. v. The American Tobacco Company*, 168 F. 3d 405, 410 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (“a court should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.”). If this court lacks subject

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<sup>2</sup> See Exhibit “I” attached and submitted with this brief.

matter jurisdiction, it is without power to act, or to enter a stay of proceedings. *Stern v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.*, 968 F. Supp. 637, 639 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (“If the court lacks jurisdiction *ab initio*, it is without jurisdiction to enter such a stay. It is incumbent upon a court whose subject matter jurisdiction is questioned to make a determination as to whether it has, or does not have, jurisdiction over the action.”). See also *United States v. Hays*, 515 U.S. 737-742-744, 155 S.Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (“The court has an independent obligation to examine the petition for removal to determine if federal jurisdiction exists over the case.”).

**B. MDL courts routinely prefer that district courts reject motions to stay and resolve any motions to remand themselves.**

In the diet drug litigation cases, Judge Louis Bechtle, the original judge presiding over the MDL, set out the Court’s preferences for all cases which could potentially be transferred to the MDL at a March 4, 1998, hearing in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Court stated:

There are one or two things. Let me mention just one or two other items that everyone here has to be concerned about. When cases are transferred here, many times they are transferred here and very little has been done in the transferor court. They have been filed there and they are a tagalong and everything kind of stops, that allows it to work. Although, in many instances there are motions filed in the transferor court, some are motions to remanded back to state court. For example, there might be other motions pending in the transferor court at the time that the case is to be transferred here. **In virtually every instance, the transferor court, when that court learns that it could become involved in the MDL, they do not rule on any of those motions. Although they have the authority and, indeed, the power to do so, they – it is a matter of custom, do not do that. It is better if they did, but they don’t.**

(See *In Re: Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine Products Liability Litigation*, MDL 1203 – March 4, 1998-Transcript pp. 105 – 106 (emphasis added)).

In MDL 1203, the Court specifically questioned why matters of remand regarding

state law issues and removal based on fraudulent joinder were being brought before the MDL court, when they were more properly decided by the local district court. *See In Re Diet Drugs Product Liability Litigation*, MDL No. 1203, Hearing Transcript, (E.D. P.A. July 16, 2002). Specifically, Judge Bartle, who succeeded Judge Bechtle, when asked to address issues regarding the alleged fraudulent joinder of defendants, asked:

“Why shouldn’t that matter be decided by the [local] federal court in Louisiana rather than my remanding cases to the State Court?” *Id.* at 15.

“Is that really a matter for me to get involved in? Isn’t it better for a [local] federal court in Mississippi to decide that? I mean, that court would certainly be better versed in the nuances of Mississippi law than I.” *Id.* at 102.

Judge Bartle further explained the reason why the local federal court is in a better position to decide the issue, and how having the MDL court decide these case specific, state law specific issues does not promote the consistency and efficiency for which an MDL is created:

“Maybe doctor x did prescribe the drug for a plaintiff in Mississippi and that doctor is appropriately joined. Maybe in another case down in Texas, a particular doctor who is joined didn’t do so.” *Id.* at 104-105.

“[I]f I make a decision, a case specific decision about what the law of Mississippi is with respect to a pharmacy, you know, I’m going to have to look at the complaint that was filed and see what the cause of action is. And then I’m going to have ... to decide what Mississippi law is. I’m going to have to decide whether it is proper to bring that particular defendant into the case.” *Id.* at 126.

“Now, maybe complaint A will have a certain theory against a pharmacy [sales representative]. And then I will have to decide, well, does Mississippi permit that or not. Then complaint B in Mississippi will have a slightly different theory. So I’m then going to have to decide whether or not in B, you can sue a pharmacy [sales representative] under that theory. Maybe you can’t sue it under theory A but maybe under B. You can’t sue under failure to warn, but we all know about the ingenuity of lawyers. There are probably or 30 in this room. And I’ll bet there could be 25 or 30 different theories that lawyers could develop to sue pharmacies [sales representatives] in Mississippi.” *Id.* at 127.

“I’m just saying to you that it’s simply, you know, deciding one Mississippi case related to pharmacies [sales representatives] may not be the end of the story.”

*Id.* at 128.

These statements illustrate the obvious truth that this local District Court is in the best position to decide the jurisdictional issue and remand motion, and no benefit will inure to either party by having the issue decided by the MDL court, except for delay, which is certainly not a tenet of the Manual for Complex Litigation, *Third Edition*, and is no basis for imposing a stay on these proceedings. Thus, the only result of a transfer to the MDL Court would be further unnecessary delay of the Plaintiff’s case.

**C. *Lilly’s Request to Stay should be denied.***

It would be inappropriate to issue a stay of the proceedings.<sup>3</sup> The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama addressed whether or not a Motion to Stay should be granted when the case is due to be remanded in *Nicholas v. The Prudential Insurance Company*, No. 97-0204-CB-C, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6579 (1997). In that case, Prudential asked the court to stay all proceedings, including Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, until the MDL Panel determined whether or not to transfer the case. Prudential pointed out to the court that similar Remand Motions had already been transferred. Prudential also argued that by allowing all Motions to Remand to be heard in one setting would “promote consistency, conserve judicial resources, and avoid duplicative discovery.” *Id.* at 14. Prudential further stated that since other courts granted

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<sup>3</sup> In *Paula Turner v. Merck & Co., Inc.*, CV-1:04 CV999-2, in the Middle District of Alabama, the Honorable Myron Thompson granted a “Consent Motion” to stay all proceedings. In *Stephanie Terrell v. Wyeth*, CV-03-BE-2876-S and *Sandra Storey v. Wyeth*, CV-04-BE-0027-E, the Honorable Karon Bowdre granted Motions to Remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction even though Defendants had filed Motions to Stay pending transfer to the MDL.

stay under identical circumstances, that court should follow suit. The court disagreed:

[M]ore importantly, the plaintiffs chose to pursue their claims in state court. It is axiomatic that ‘federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ and that ‘plaintiff is still the master of his own claim.’ To allow this case to be transferred to the District of New Jersey unnecessarily burdens the plaintiffs’ right to proceed in the forum of their own choosing. Even if the District Court in New Jersey ultimately remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, the plaintiffs would nevertheless be forced to pursue their claim in a forum not of their choosing one thousand miles from home. In light of the clearly improper removal of this case, such circumstances are simply intolerable.

*Nicholas v. The Prudential Insurance Company*, No. 97-0204-CB-C, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6579 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (*citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co.*, 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994)).

The Southern District addressed this issue again on June 5, 2006 in cases involving the same pharmaceutical drug as the instant case. Judge Steele found that the resources of the federal courts are better expended by having the transferor court deciding the jurisdictional issues:

The economy of the transferor court presumably is always enhanced by deferring ruling on a motion to remand, since it takes no effort to do nothing. However, an accurate assessment of judicial economy requires consideration of the time and effort of all courts involved; a deferral that saves one court an hour’s work but costs other courts several more is scarcely a conservator of judicial resources.

...

To defer ruling on a plainly meritorious motion to remand forces a body of seven judges (who have their own dockets in addition to the Panel’s) to needlessly review and hear argument on requests for transfer, objections thereto, and post-transfer matters.

*Betts Order* at 3.

Moreover, Judge Steele addressed the practical aspects of having a foreign court decide issues involving unfamiliar state-law:

A transferee court sitting elsewhere is not only unlikely to possess unusual familiarity with the Alabama law, but is likely to be less conversant with that law than a transferor court that regularly considers Alabama legal issues when it sits in diversity. In such cases, the transferee court will require more time than the transferor court to resolve the motion, because it must first acquaint itself with Alabama law the transferor court already knows, resulting in an additional tax on judicial economy. Moreover, the transferee court stands at a similar comparative disadvantage with respect to motions to remand involving the law of the remaining 50 or more local jurisdictions outside its own.

*Id.* at 6. Plaintiff would respectfully urge this Court to follow Judge Steele's lead and see Lilly's Motion to Stay for what it is – an unnecessary and impractical waste of judicial resources.

Courts in the Tenth Circuit have also addressed the issue of whether it is appropriate to allow transfer of a civil action to an MDL Panel where there is no original jurisdiction in the district court. *See Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoeschst Aktiengesellschaft*, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Kan. 1999); *Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp.*, 2000 WL 57501 (D. Kan. 2000).

In the *Aetna* case, plaintiffs filed numerous claims against defendant drug manufacturers in state court in Kansas alleging unfair competition and violations of the Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection Act, K.S.A. § 50-101 et seq. *Aetna*, 54 F. Supp2d at 1046. Plaintiffs' complaint made no allegations that would give rise to original federal jurisdiction. The defendants improperly removed the action to federal court and moved for a stay pending the rulings from a Multi-District Litigation Panel that was hearing similar complaints in other cases. *Id* at. 1046. The *Aetna* Court gave a full treatment of the law and rationale behind their decision to handle the jurisdictional question first by stating:

Defendants argue that the Court should stay consideration of plaintiffs' motion for remand (and all other issues) until the Joint panel on Multi-District Litigation ("JPMDL") has decided their motion to consolidate numerous similar actions. Defendants contend that plaintiffs will still get a chance to seek remand, after the JPMDL has made its decision.

The Court sees no reason to delay ruling on plaintiffs' motion to remand. The Court retains jurisdiction to decide the remand issue, despite defendants' motion to the J.P.M.D.L. See panel Rule 1.5, 181 F.R.D. 1, 3 (1988).<sup>4</sup> Defendants cite district courts which have already addressed the jurisdictional issue, which is an important preliminary issue in this case. "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).

While staying the proceedings might allow a single district court to rule on the jurisdictional issue in the various cases, a stay would not affect the law that applies to the present case and little would be gained by a stay on the motion to remand. The parties would still be subject to Kansas law. No great judicial economy will be realized from a delay. The parties will not save time, for they have already briefed the remand issue. The Court is well versed in both Kansas and federal law, while the transferor court would need to apply the law of different states to different claims. **For purposes of judicial economy, the jurisdictional issue should be resolved immediately. If federal jurisdiction does not exist, the case can be remanded before trial resources are further expended. In the Court's view, judicial economy dictates a present ruling on the remand issue.**

*Aetna*, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1047, 1048 (emphasis added).

The same district expanded the *Aetna* decision in *Havens Protected "C" Clamps, Inc. v. Pilkington, PLC*, 2000 WL 382027 (D. Kan. 2000). In *Havens*, the plaintiffs once again filed a complaint that provided no foothold for federal jurisdiction. The defendants improperly removed the case to federal court and requested a stay pending consolidation rulings by an MDL Panel. *Havens*, 2000 WL 382027 \*1. Prior to the defendants' motion,

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<sup>4</sup> **Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Rule 1.5. Effect of the Pendency of an Action Before the Panel:** The pendency of a motion, order to show cause, conditional transfer order or conditional remand order before the Panel concerning transfer or remand of an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not affect or suspend orders and pretrial proceedings in the district court in which the action is pending and does not in any way limit the pretrial jurisdiction of that court. A transfer or remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 shall be effective when the transfer or remand order is filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the transferee district.

the Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. The *Havens* court chose to rule on the propriety of issuing a stay absent a showing of federal jurisdiction. The Court stated:

According to Panel Rule 1.5, this court's jurisdiction is not affected by the MDL panel's issuance of a conditional transfer order, and therefore this court retains jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs' pending motion to remand. Because disposition of plaintiffs' motion to remand requires the court to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists over the action, the court believes that, in the interests of judicial economy, resolution of plaintiffs' motion is appropriate at this juncture. Indeed, because the issues raised in plaintiffs' motion to remand have been fully briefed by the parties, and further because there is reason to believe that the transferee court would be a more suitable forum for resolution of the matters raised therein, the court can perceive no benefit to deferring ruling on plaintiffs' motion...Finally, the court notes that **there is at least some authority for the proposition that a district court cannot stay proceedings for which it lacks jurisdiction**...Accordingly, defendants' informal request to stay these proceedings pending the transfer of the case by the MDL Panel is denied.

*Havens*, 2000 WL 382027 \*2 (emphasis added).

In *Lloyd v. Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc.*, 58 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.W.Va. 1999), the court ruled that it is without the power to stay proceedings in cases where no federal jurisdiction is present. The court ruled:

This Court cannot, however, stay proceedings in an action over which it lacks jurisdiction. Removal statutes must be construed strictly against removal.

*Adkins v. Gibson*, 906 F. Supp. 345 346 (S.D.W.Va. 1995) (Haden, C.J.) (citing *Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co.*, 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994)); accord *Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 870 F. Supp. 123, 124 (S.D.W.Va. 1994)(Haden, C.J.). The burden of establishing the propriety of removal falls upon the removing party. *Mulcahey*, 29 F.3d at 151. If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, remand is necessary.

*Lloyd*, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 696.

Likewise, the United States District for the Northern District of California addressed this very issue in *Tortola Restaurants v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.*, 987 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Cal. 1997). This case involved a class action suit brought by citizens of

California against Kimberly-Clark for a price fixing scheme. Defendants improperly removed the case to federal court and moved to stay proceedings pending pretrial rulings by an MDL Panel. The Court properly denied the defendants' motion to stay and remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *Id.* at 1190. In the discussion for defendants' motion to stay the Court noted:

A putative transferor court need not automatically postpone rulings on pending motions, or in any way generally suspend proceedings, merely on grounds that an MDL transfer motion has been filed. See Manual for Complex Litigation 3d § 31.131, p. 252 (3d ed. 1995); see also *Villareal v. Chrysler Corp.*, No. C-95-4414, 1996, WL 116832, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1996) ("a stay is improper. Judicial economy will be best served by addressing the remand issue [as it] will facilitate litigation in the appropriate forum").

Here, a motion has been filed with this Court seeking a determination of the appropriate forum in which to litigate this matter. 'The appropriate forum, moreover, is a threshold issue to class certification and defendants' petition to the Panel does not affect scheduled pretrial proceedings.' This Court, as transferor Court, 'retains exclusive jurisdiction until the § 1407 transfer becomes effective and as such, **motions to remand should be resolved before the panel acts on the motion to transfer.**' *Spitzfaden v. Dow Corning Corp.*, No. 95-2578, 1995 WL 662663, \*4 n. 1 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 1995)(citing Manual for Complex Litigation, 3d § 31.131.) Accordingly, defendants' motion for stay of proceedings pending a decision by the Panel is hereby DENIED, and the Court addresses the merits of plaintiff's remand motion.

*Tortola*, 987 F. Supp at 1189 (emphasis added).

Such is the case at bar. This Court should examine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction before any decision to stay the proceedings pending the transfer of this case to the MDL has been made.

## CONCLUSION

Since there is no subject matter jurisdiction in this case, there is no reason for this Court to postpone its decision on the jurisdictional issue while awaiting a decision of the

Judicial Panel. For the Plaintiff's sake and for the sake of judicial economy and efficiency, this Court should exercise its discretion and resolve the jurisdictional issue once and for all.

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of July, 2006.

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing document upon the parties as listed below by placing a copy of same in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid on this the 31st day of July, 2006.

James C. Barton  
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/s/ FRANK WOODSON

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Of Counsel

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

DEBRA BETTS, )  
                  )  
Plaintiff,     )  
                  )  
v.               ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0259-WS-B  
                  )  
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, et al.,     )  
                  )  
Defendants.     )

**ORDER**

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") to stay all proceedings, (Doc. 4), and on the plaintiff's motion to remand. (Doc. 14). The parties have submitted briefs and other materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 5, 15, 21, 22), and the motions are ripe for resolution. After carefully considering the foregoing, as well as other relevant materials in the file,<sup>1</sup> the Court concludes that the motion to stay is due to be denied and the motion to remand is due to be granted.

**BACKGROUND**

This suit is one of hundreds brought against Lilly as the manufacturer of Zyprexa. The plaintiff sued Lilly in state court on several causes of action and also sued her treating physician for medical negligence. (Complaint at 8). Both the plaintiff and the physician are citizens of Alabama, but Lilly removed on the basis of diversity of citizenship, claiming that the physician was fraudulently joined and so could be ignored for purposes of showing complete diversity.

Multidistrict litigation concerning Zyprexa has been established in the Eastern District of New York, and Lilly intends to seek transfer of this case to the MDL Court. Lilly's motion requests a stay of all proceedings in this Court pending transfer, including the plaintiff's motion to remand.

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<sup>1</sup>In particular, the Court has considered the notice of removal and appended complaint, (Doc. 1), the motion to dismiss filed by defendant John Richard Cranton, (Doc. 8), and the parties' briefs on the motion to dismiss. (Docs. 16, 20).

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## DISCUSSION

The parties agree that the Court has the authority to rule on a motion to remand whatever the likelihood that the MDL Panel will order transfer to the MDL Court. They differ as to whether the Court should exercise that authority or defer ruling by staying these proceedings pending transfer.

### I. Motion to Stay.

Lilly argues that a stay of proceedings without reaching the motion to remand "will promote judicial economy, avoid inconsistent rulings by different district courts and avoid prejudice to both plaintiff and defendant." (Doc. 5 at 7). District courts have routinely isolated these as the key considerations in whether to grant a stay pending transfer to an MDL court, including when a motion to remand is pending. The rub comes in the courts' varied ways of assessing and valuing these considerations. It would serve no good purpose to engage in a thorough review of the many opinions in this arena, both because most of them lack detailed analysis and because this Court has already adopted a standard for gauging motions to defer ruling on a pending motion to remand: "[a] court should first give preliminary scrutiny to the merits of the motion to remand" and ..., "if this preliminary assessment suggests that removal was improper, the court should promptly complete its consideration and remand the case to state court." *Moton v. Bayer Corp.*, 2005 WL 1653731 at \*2 (S.D. Ala. 2005)(quoting *Meyers v. Bayer AG*, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (E.D. Wis. 2001)).<sup>2</sup>

The Court has adopted this portion of *Meyers* because it appears better calculated to vindicate the interests of judicial economy, consistency of result, and minimization of prejudice to the parties than a reflexive rule that automatically defers decision to an MDL court whenever

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<sup>2</sup>Under *Meyers*, even when a jurisdictional issue is difficult, the transferor court should not automatically defer ruling but should first "determine whether identical or similar jurisdictional issues have been raised in other cases that have been or may be transferred to the MDL proceedings." 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. Because neither *Moton* nor this case presents a difficult jurisdictional issue, the Court need not decide whether it would adopt this second step of the *Meyers* approach.

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it can be predicted that an issue at least superficially similar may arise in other transferred cases. Because the question is a recurring one, the Court pauses to amplify the reasons it gave in *Motion* for drawing this conclusion.

The economy of the transferor court presumably is always enhanced by deferring ruling on a motion to remand, since it takes no effort to do nothing. However, an accurate assessment of judicial economy requires consideration of the time and effort of all courts involved; a deferral that saves one court an hour's work but costs other courts several more is scarcely a conservator of judicial resources. The *Meyers* approach respects this economic fact. Because the result in a motion to remand captured by the first *Meyers* step is apparent on initial review, the transferor court's investment in resolving the motion is minimal or at least minor. All things being equal, the investment of the transferee court in deciding the same motion would be roughly equivalent, resulting in a neutral effect on judicial economy — scarcely an argument in favor of deferral. But in the MDL context there is always a third court involved: the MDL Panel. To defer ruling on a plainly meritorious motion to remand forces that body of seven judges (who have their own dockets in addition to the Panel's) to needlessly review and hear argument on requests for transfer, objections thereto, and post-transfer matters. Because the first step of *Meyers* assumes it is clear that the case must be remanded, every minute of time spent by the Panel on the case is wasted, guaranteeing that deferral results in a net loss of judicial economy.<sup>3</sup>

The only means possible to overcome the negative judicial economy created when a transferor court defers ruling on a clear motion to remand is to invoke the economies of scale. The idea is that, although it would be inefficient to transfer to an MDL court a single case with a motion to remand, it is efficient to transfer twenty such cases, because the MDL court can dispose of twenty motions to remand more efficiently than twenty courts can dispose of one motion to remand each.

The anticipated economies of scale, however, disappear when the motions to remand are straightforward and easily resolved. This follows from two related phenomena: first, in a simple

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<sup>3</sup>This is true without considering the wasted efforts of clerks in three courts who must manage the flow of filings and physically ship what paper products remain in this electronic age.

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case each transferor court will invest little time in resolving the issue (which provides a limited pool of potential savings from deferral); and second, the transferee court must of course review each case individually before reaching its conclusion (which drains the potential savings from deferral).<sup>4</sup> The Panel's investment in transferring twenty cases consumes whatever marginal savings remain. Judicial economy thus remains unimproved by even a large-scale transfer of cases with identical, plainly meritorious motions to remand.<sup>5</sup>

Implementing the first step of the *Meyers* approach imposes costs on the transferor court that should be considered in evaluating the net effect of the approach on judicial economy. The preliminary assessment required by *Meyers* naturally consumes judicial time. When the assessment confirms that the motion is due to be granted, the time spent performing it is recaptured without loss in the disposition of the motion. When, however, the assessment reflects that deferral is appropriate, the transferor court cannot directly recapture the time expended in making the assessment. Performing the assessment thus results in an arguable loss of judicial economy in such cases.

This incidental cost of following *Meyers*, however, does not warrant rejecting it. First, the cost does not reflect a true loss of judicial economy, any more than does a court's sua sponte examination of its subject matter jurisdiction which confirms the existence of such jurisdiction. In both situations, it is highly economical to scrutinize jurisdictional matters at an early stage,

<sup>4</sup>This (along with the increased risk of inconsistent results) explain why *Meyers* treats complicated motions to remand differently. When the analysis is difficult to develop or apply, each transferor court must expend significant resources to decide its motion to remand. The transferee court initially must do so as well but, once the analysis and its application are mastered, it can resolve additional motions to remand more efficiently than a transferor court starting from scratch.

<sup>5</sup>Truly identical motions to remand are perhaps more the exception than the rule. Defendants typically label motions to remand as "similar" if only they involve the same general challenge to jurisdiction — for example, amount in controversy or, as in this case, fraudulent joinder. But these broad labels often hide a welter of individual issues — as well as unique facts and varying bodies of controlling state law — that would require individual attention if left for the transferee court to decide. All such variations increase the time the transferee court must devote to each motion, exacerbating the inefficiencies of deferral when the outcome of an individual case is clear.

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regardless of whether in a particular case that scrutiny discloses the presence or absence of jurisdiction.<sup>6</sup> Second, the amount of time required to perform a preliminary assessment is almost always measured in minutes and so cannot have a significant effect on overall judicial economy. Most importantly, the time so spent is dwarfed by the time that MDL courts and the Panel would waste were *Meyers* rejected so that transferor courts automatically deferred ruling on even obvious motions to remand.

With judicial economy eliminated as a justification for rejecting the *Meyers* approach, only the risk of inconsistent results and prejudice to the parties remain for consideration. Because the first step of *Meyers* contemplates that different judges will review similar motions to remand, it is of course possible they will reach different results. To the extent the motions are similar but not identical in terms of the facts presented, the law governing, and the arguments asserted, such disparity in result is neither surprising nor undesirable and would probably be mimicked by the transferee judge. But because *Meyers* contemplates that only obvious motions to remand will be decided by the transferor court, the possibility of inconsistent results on truly indistinguishable facts, law and argument is largely theoretical.<sup>7</sup> As for prejudice, no party has a right to remain in federal court when subject matter jurisdiction is plainly lacking, and a defendant caught by *Meyers* is thus not prejudiced in any meaningful sense by an early rather than late remand to state court.

Lilly proffers a fistful of ineffectual arguments why the Court should not reach the plaintiff's motion to remand. First, Lilly argues that "[t]he issue of fraudulent joinder ... is much more complex than a simple amount in controversy inquiry" as in *Meyers*, such that a preliminary assessment is inadequate to determine whether removal was improper. (Doc. 21 at 5). It is doubtlessly true that some fraudulent joinder issues are sufficiently intricate that a

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<sup>6</sup>See *University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co.*, 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999)(because a court is powerless to act without jurisdiction, it "should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.").

<sup>7</sup>*Accord Board of Trustees v. Worldcom, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("The threat of inconsistent judgments [under *Meyers*] is de minimus.").

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preliminary assessment of them would not enable a court to reach a confident conclusion.<sup>8</sup> This Court, however, is not considering a hypothetical or even typical case, but rather the specific case pleaded by the plaintiff now before the Court. It is simply irrelevant whether different fraudulent joinder issues might be immune to resolution by preliminary assessment; the only question is whether *this* fraudulent joinder issue, presented by *this* defendant in *this* manner in *this* case, is susceptible of such a resolution. As discussed in Part II, it is.

Indeed, fraudulent joinder issues are particularly poor candidates for reflexive deferral. As noted in Part II, whether a resident defendant is fraudulently joined depends on the plaintiff's ability to establish a cause of action under state law, in this case the law of Alabama. A transferee court sitting elsewhere is not only unlikely to possess unusual familiarity with Alabama law but is likely to be less conversant with that law than a transferor court that regularly considers Alabama legal issues when it sits in diversity. In such cases, the transferee court will require more time than the transferor court to resolve the motion, because it must first acquaint itself with Alabama law the transferor court already knows, resulting in an additional tax on judicial economy. Moreover, the transferee court stands at a similar comparative disadvantage with respect to motions to remand involving the law of the remaining 50 or more local jurisdictions outside its own. It is thus unsurprising that courts have repeatedly cited the necessity of resort to local law as bolstering the case for deciding a motion to remand prior to transfer.<sup>9</sup>

Second, Lilly asserts that other MDL courts have addressed fraudulent joinder issues and

<sup>8</sup>This was the case in *Stempien v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 2006 WL 1214836 (N.D. Cal. 2006), on which Lilly relies for its argument.

<sup>9</sup>See *Cordle v. Merck & Co.*, 405 F. Supp. 800, 803 n.4 (E.D. Ky. 2005); *Galati v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 2005 WL 3533387 at \*1 (W.D. Mo. 2005); *Greene v. Wyeth*, 344 F. Supp. 2d 674, 679 (D. Nev. 2004); *In re: Massachusetts Diet Drug Litigation*, 338 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201 (D. Mass. 2004); *Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc.*, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2004); *Speaker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories*, 2003 WL 22938955 at \*1 (N.D. Tex. 2003); *Morales v. American Home Products Corp.*, 214 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (S.D. Tex. 2002); *McQuilkin v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2001 WL 197840 at \*1 (E.D. La. 2001); *Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp.*, 2000 WL 575021 at \*2 (D. Kan. 2000); *Kohl v. American Home Products Corp.*, 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

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thereby "created a body of case law that provides valuable consistency and guidance for all involved," (Doc. 5 at 10), apparently to suggest that unusual efficiencies accompany deferral of such issues. There is of course no separate fraudulent joinder jurisprudence applicable only to MDL litigation and, at any rate, the Court is as able to apply principles emerging from MDL litigation as is a transferee court. To the extent Lilly in opposition to remand relies on fraudulent joinder cases decided in the MDL context, the Court in Part II reviews and distinguishes them.

Third, Lilly points out that plaintiff's counsel has filed a total of nine Zyprexa actions in Alabama, all including substantially similar allegations against a treating physician and all generating the same arguments from Lilly as to why the physicians were fraudulently joined. To further judicial economy and ensure consistency, Lilly argues, all nine motions to remand should be deferred to the MDL Court. (Doc. 5 at 14-15; Doc. 21 at 12-13). Because this is an easy case, however, as discussed above there is no economy or consistency to be gained by deferral. Indeed, by insisting that the nine rise or fall together, Lilly concedes that motions to remand in the other eight cases are as clear cut as the motion to remand in this one and so will neither consume significant resources of the transferor courts nor pose an appreciable risk of inconsistent results.<sup>10</sup>

Fourth, Lilly complains that it will be prejudiced if the Court remands this case but the MDL Court would not. (Doc. 21 at 14). Although couched in terms of prejudice, this is actually an attempt to revisit consistency. Because, as discussed in Part II and as contemplated by the *Meyers* test, the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is perfectly clear, there is no real risk of inconsistent results.

Next, Lilly insists that the MDL Court, the Panel, and another MDL court have all encouraged transferor courts to defer ruling on motions to remand. (Doc. 5 at 18; Doc. 21 at 2, 11-12). The Court, however, finds no such imprimatur. The Panel routinely issues a letter to transferor courts after a request for transfer has been received, which includes the following language:

If you have a motion pending — such as a motion to remand to state

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<sup>10</sup>Although unnecessary to the Court's conclusion, five of the nine cases are on its docket, cutting Lilly's argument in half before it begins.

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court (if the action was removed to your court) — you are free to rule on the motion, of course, or wait until the Panel has decided the transfer issue. The latter course may be especially appropriate if the motion raises questions likely to arise in other actions in the transferee court and, in the interest of uniformity, might best be decided there if the Panel orders centralization.

(Doc. 21, Exhibit A). By its terms, the Panel's invitation extends only to motions whose resolution by the transferor court threatens "the interest of uniformity" and, as discussed above, motions to remand captured by the first step of *Meyers* do not threaten that interest.

Judge Weinstein's suggestion, issued just after establishment of the Zyprexa MDL litigation in early 2004, is even more remote:

The parties shall send a letter to the litigants in, and judges for, each of the state court cases indicating that this court intends to provide for coordinated discovery on the underlying scientific and related issues. The letter shall notify the addressees that they may wish to take appropriate action to coordinate or integrate discovery with that in this court. Appropriate action may include stays, stipulations to be bound by discovery in the MDL cases, stipulations to receive notice of any discovery in the MDL cases, and stipulations or orders to participate in any discovery in those cases.

(Doc. 5, Exhibit L). On its face, this letter suggests only a stay of state-court cases, not of removed cases and certainly not of removed cases harboring facially meritorious motions to remand.

The comments of the fen-phen MDL Court merit the closest attention:

[W]e are continuing to address the fraudulent joinder of individual physicians and pharmacies as defendants as a means to prevent removal. Many of these issues have common patterns as well as ramifications far beyond any specific case. Again, we believe these issues are best resolved in a uniform manner through the coordinated proceedings of MDL 1203.

*Braden v. Wyeth*, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28734 at \*65-66 (N.D. Ala. 2004)(quoting *In re: Diet Drugs Product Liability Litigation*, MDL No. 1203, PTO-2984). Implicit in the MDL Court's statement are its extensive experience with such issues and the complexity of them. See *id.* at \*65 ("We have now developed a broader perspective than is usually available to individual transferor courts in dealing with widespread efforts fraudulently to join Phentermine manufacturers as a tactic to thwart removal ...."). Complex remand motions, of course, lie beyond the first step of *Meyers* and so may well be fit for resolution by a transferee court, but this plaintiff's motion is anything but complex. Moreover, when as here the motion to remand is

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simple, a transferee court's experience with such motions does not give it a significant advantage in deciding others of like simplicity. At any rate, Lilly has not identified any particular expertise of the MDL Court with respect to motions to remand centered on the fraudulent joinder *vel non* of a treating physician under Alabama or other law.

Finally, Lilly lists numerous transferor courts that have granted stays pending transfer in this and other MDL litigation. Many of the cases cited are inapposite because no motion to remand had been filed. Additional padding stems from Lilly's practice of citing multiple decisions by the same judge in the same MDL litigation as if they represented independent conclusions. These and other methodological flaws make it difficult to accept at face value Lilly's representation that the "overwhelming majority of courts" defer ruling on motions to remand. (Doc. 21 at 1).<sup>11</sup> Moreover, few of Lilly's cited cases involve issues of fraudulent joinder, certainly fewer than the decisions of which the Court is aware in which the transferor court addressed fraudulent joinder prior to transfer.<sup>12</sup> Finally, because most of the cited orders provide little or no information about the motion to remand or its complexity, they are not facially inconsistent with *Meyers*.

At any rate, the Court does not believe that its decision should be based on a simple tally

<sup>11</sup>The statement is certainly incorrect with respect to the three federal districts in Alabama, as the plaintiff has submitted recent unpublished orders from eleven district judges (excluding the undersigned) and three magistrate judges remanding cases that were awaiting transfer to an MDL court. (Doc. 15, Exhibit 1).

<sup>12</sup>See, e.g., *Hedges v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 2006 WL 1970545 at \*3-6 (E.D. Ky. 2006); *Riddle v. Merck & Co.*, 2006 WL 1064070 at \*1-2 (S.D. Ill. 2006); *Davis v. Ocwen Federal Bank*, 2006 WL 155241 at \*2 n.11 (M.D. Ala. 2006); *Copeland v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 2005 WL 3533394 at \*1-2 (W.D. Mo. 2005); *Martin v. Merck & Co.*, 2005 WL 1984483 at \*5-6 (E.D. Cal. 2005); *Greene v. Wyeth*, 344 F. Supp. 2d 674, 679 (D. Nev. 2004); *In re: Massachusetts Diet Drug Litigation*, 338 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201 (D. Mass. 2004); *Speaker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories*, 2003 WL 22938955 at \*1 (N.D. Tex. 2003); *Danos v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*, 2003 WL 21056815 at \*1-2 (E.D. La. 2003); *Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.*, 232 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Tex. 2002); *Morales v. American Home Products Corp.*, 214 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (S.D. Tex. 2002); *Bellorin v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.*, 236 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676 (W.D. Tex. 2001); *Carden v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.*, 2000 WL 33520302 at \*4 (S.D. Fla. 2000); *Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp.*, 2000 WL 575021 at \*2 (D. Kan. 2000); *Kohl v. American Home Products Corp.*, 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (W.D. Ark. 1999).

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of results in other cases.<sup>13</sup> More important to the Court is the strength of the reasoning employed to reach those results, and the orders relied on by Lilly that offer explanation for their rulings do little more than articulate the conclusion that the interests of judicial economy, consistency of result and minimization of prejudice to the parties will best be furthered by a stay. Suffice it to say that nothing to which Lilly has drawn the Court's attention undermines the Court's confidence in the *Meyers* approach and its application here.

In summary, Lilly's motion to stay — and thereby defer ruling on the plaintiff's motion to remand — is due to be denied.

## II. Motion to Remand.

“Fraudulent joinder is a judicially created doctrine that provides an exception to the requirement of complete diversity.” *Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.*, 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998). “[T]he removing party has the burden of proving that ... there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant ...” *Crowe v. Coleman*, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). The possibility of establishing a cause of action must be reasonable rather than merely theoretical. *Legg v. Wyeth*, 428 F.3d 1317, 1324, 1325 n.5 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005). In making its determination, the Court “must ... resolve any uncertainties about the applicable law in the plaintiff's favor.” *Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co.*, 139 F.3d 1368, 1380

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<sup>13</sup>If it did, the numbers would favor *Meyers*. At least twelve courts have embraced *Meyers*, and the only opinion known to have rejected it adopted instead an approach less favorable to removing defendants. See *Rutherford v. Merck & Co.*, 2006 WL 1064071 at \*2 (S.D. Ill. 2006); *Martin v. Merck & Co.*, 2005 WL 1984483 at \*1-2 (E.D. Cal. 2005); *Edsall v. Merck & Co.*, 2005 WL 1867730 at \*3 (N.D. Cal. 2005)(Patel, J.); *Moton v. Bayer Corp.*, 2005 WL 1653731 at \*2 (S.D. Ala. 2005); *Hotseller v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 2005 WL 756224 at \*2 (S.D. Ind. 2005); *Wisconsin v. Abbott Laboratories*, 2004 WL 2055717 at \*1 (W.D. Wis. 2004); *Brock v. Stolt-Nielsen SA*, 2004 WL 1837934 at \*2 (N.D. Cal. 2004)(Smith, J.); *Nekritz v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC*, 2004 WL 1462035 at \*2 (D.N.J. 2004); *Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc.*, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053-54 (N.D. Cal. 2004)(Armstrong, J.); *New Mexico State Investment Council v. Alexander*, 317 B.R. 440, 443-44 (D.N.M. 2004); *Chinn v. Belfer*, 2002 WL 31474189 at \*3 (D. Or. 2002); *Board of Trustees v. Worldcom, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902-03 (N.D. Ill. 2002); cf. *Pennsylvania v. Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.*, 415 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521 & n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2005)(rejecting *Meyers* in favor of an inflexible rule of addressing motions to remand prior to motions to stay).

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(11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998).

Lilly offers three reasons why the Court should conclude that the treating physician was fraudulently joined: (1) the complaint does not satisfy the pleading requirements imposed on medical malpractice plaintiffs by Alabama statute; (2) the plaintiff's claim against the physician is negated by irreconcilable allegations she makes against Lilly; and (3) her allegations against the physician are conclusory, without accompanying factual detail. A preliminary assessment exposed these arguments' plain lack of merit, as discussed below.

#### **A. State Pleading Requirements.**

In any action for injury, damages, or wrongful death ... against a health care provider for breach of the standard of care, ... [t]he plaintiff shall include in the complaint filed in the action a detailed specification and factual description of each act and omission alleged by plaintiff to render the health care provider liable to plaintiff and shall include when feasible and ascertainable the date, time, and place of the act or acts. ... Any complaint which fails to include such detailed specification and factual description of each act and omission shall be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Ala. Code § 6-5-551.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff's physician prescribed Zyprexa "from approximately October 1996 to November 2004." (Complaint, ¶ 8). It alleges that the physician knew or should have known that possible side effects and dangers of Zyprexa include glucose intolerance, pancreatitis, hyperglycemia and diabetes, and it alleges further that he violated the applicable standard of care by failing to warn the plaintiff of these risks and failing to advise her to monitor for early signs of these conditions. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 26-30).<sup>14</sup>

Lilly first argues that the complaint lacks "a detailed specification and factual description of each act and omission." (Doc. 1 at 11). As pointed out by the plaintiff, however, the Alabama Supreme Court has construed the quoted language as requiring the plaintiff to give "fair notice of the allegedly negligent act"; as long as fair notice is provided, "courts should

<sup>14</sup>In addition to failure to warn, the complaint alleges that the physician wrongfully prescribed Zyprexa. (*Id.*). Because a fraudulent joinder argument fails if it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can establish any of her alleged causes of action, the Court confines its attention to the failure-to-warn claim, which is also the principal focus of Lilly's attack.

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strive to find that the complaint includes the necessary ‘detailed specification and factual description of each act and omission alleged.’” *Mikkelsen v. Salama*, 619 So. 2d 1382, 1384 (Ala. 1993). The third-party complaint in *Mikkelsen* alleged that the defendant’s physician prescribed a medication for bipolar disorder but failed to warn her not to operate a motor vehicle while taking the medication or suffering from the disorder. *Id.* at 1384-85. The Supreme Court held that these simple allegations satisfied the pleading requirements of Section 6-5-551 for a claim of failure to warn. *Id.* at 1385. In light of the similarity of the allegations in *Mikkelsen* to those in this case, there is plainly more than a reasonable possibility that an Alabama court would find the plaintiff’s allegations to satisfy the statute. Lilly, confronted with *Mikkelsen* in the motion to remand, has not attempted to disagree. (Doc. 22 at 8-9).

The bulk of Lilly’s thin statutory argument is dedicated to the proposition that the complaint fails to provide “the date, time, and place of the act or acts.” In the first place, the obligation to address time and location applies to acts, not omissions, and the plaintiff’s claim of failure to warn concerns an omission, not an act. The Alabama Legislature plainly understood the difference between acts and omissions, since Section 6-5-551 uses the term “act or omission” three times, such that its use of “act or acts” cannot easily be disregarded as unintended or inconsequential. Limiting the requirement to acts also makes sense because, while an act usually occurs at a specific site and at a specific time that can be readily identified, an omission is almost always ongoing and not easily described in terms of a specific time and location.

In the second place, Section 6-5-551 requires that information as to time and place be provided only “when feasible and ascertainable.” Because a failure to warn is an ongoing wrong, providing such specifics may not be feasible. The physician (but not Lilly) suggests that it would be feasible to identify the dates on which he prescribed Zyprexa, (Doc. 20 at 3), but prescribing medication, while an “act” and not an omission, is not obviously an act “alleged by plaintiff to render the health care provider liable” for purposes of her failure-to-warn claim. At any rate, neither the physician nor Lilly provides any basis for concluding either that the plaintiff had access to this information before filing suit or that the information was “ascertainable”

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within the contemplation of the statute even absent such access.<sup>15</sup>

In the third place, Section 6-5-551 limits the grounds for dismissal to the failure to provide "such detailed specification and factual description of each act and omission." A comparison of this language with that setting forth the statutory pleading requirements suggests that the sanction of dismissal is available only for inadequately identifying and describing the wrongful act or omission, not for deficiencies in pleading time or place.

The Court need not and does not hold that Section 6-5-551 is as narrow as depicted in the preceding paragraphs; to dispose of Lilly's fraudulent joinder argument, the Court need only determine that it is reasonably possible the Alabama courts would adopt at least one of these three interpretations. Given their facial plausibility, their consistency with the statutory language employed, and the Supreme Court's focus in *Mikkelsen* on fair notice rather than technical precision, that reasonable possibility plainly exists.

The result is not altered even if these arguments are ignored and it is assumed that the plaintiff was required on pain of dismissal to allege the time and place of the physician's failure to warn. The third-party complaint in *Mikkelsen* alleged that the physician's failure to warn occurred "[w]hile [he was] treating" the defendant, which treatment began several weeks before the motor vehicle accident that prompted the lawsuit. 619 So. 2d at 1385. Without discussion, the *Mikkelsen* Court held that the complaint "sufficiently alleged the date and place of [the doctor's] negligent act." *Id.* Lilly argues that *Mikkelsen* stands for the proposition that, while an allegation of time in a failure-to-warn case need not identify specific dates, it must isolate a narrow window of time, such as the "several weeks" at issue in *Mikkelsen*. (Doc. 22 at 9). This is certainly one plausible way to spin *Mikkelsen*, but it is not the only one. It is equally reasonable to read *Mikkelsen* for the proposition that, in a failure-to-warn case, Section 6-5-551 is satisfied by an allegation that the failure to warn occurred throughout the treatment period, with the inclusive dates of treatment provided. The reasonableness of this interpretation is only enhanced by the *Mikkelsen* Court's identification of "fair notice" as the touchstone for

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<sup>15</sup>The physician's "assum[ption]" that the plaintiff acquired her medical records before filing suit, (*id.*), is scarcely an assurance that she did so. Indeed, his ignorance of whether she obtained medical records of which he is presumably the custodian indicates that she did not have access to them when she filed suit.

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construing the statute's pleading requirements. Because it is reasonably possible that the Alabama courts would adopt the latter view, and because the complaint's allegation that the physician prescribed the plaintiff Zyprexa from approximately October 1996 to November 2004 falls within its parameters, Lilly's fraudulent joinder argument fails.<sup>16</sup>

#### **B. Mutually Exclusive Allegations.**

Count Seven, which asserts a claim of fraud, misrepresentation and suppression against Lilly, alleges in part as follows:

The Defendants [sic] knew or should have known that these representations were false and made the representations with the intent or purpose that the Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's physician would rely on them, leading to the use of the drug by the Plaintiff.

(Complaint, ¶ 72). Drawing from this assertion, Lilly argues that “[t]he allegations that Lilly failed to provide accurate representations regarding the safety of Zyprexa to Plaintiff's physician render untenable any allegation that [the treating physician] is liable to Plaintiff for ... negligently monitoring and informing Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1 at 12; Doc. 22 at 6). Lilly cites several cases which found fraudulent joinder when a claim that a physician failed to warn of risks in the use of a prescribed medication was contradicted by allegations that the manufacturer failed to disclose those risks to the physician; the latter allegations made it impossible for the plaintiff to establish a claim because a physician has no duty to warn of dangers of which he could not have known.<sup>17</sup> Assuming without deciding that the same test should be applied here, it does not undermine the plaintiff's claim against her physician. The critical circumstance in the

<sup>16</sup>*Mikkelsen* held that the third-party complaint adequately alleged the place of the wrongful conduct even though the pleading was silent as to where the conduct occurred. 619 So. 2d at 1384-85. Lilly makes no separate argument concerning the pleading of place but, in any event, *Mikkelsen* establishes a reasonable possibility that the Alabama courts would conclude that the plaintiff's complaint is not deficient in this regard.

<sup>17</sup>See *Flores v. Merck & Co.*, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28017 at \*2 (S.D. Tex. 2004); *In re Baycol Products Litigation*, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28068 at \*5 (D. Minn. 2003); *Baisden v. Bayer Corp.*, 275 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (S.D.W. Va. 2003); *Omobude v. Merck & Co.*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27006 at \*4 (S.D. Miss. 2003); *Brown v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27445 at \*17 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

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cases upon which Lilly relies is that the complaint identified no source of information available to the physician other than the manufacturer. When the allegations of such a complaint negate the manufacturer as a source of information about the drug's risks, it follows that the physician could not have known of the risks he failed to address. The situation is entirely different when the complaint alleges that the physician knew or should have known of the drug's dangers from other sources, and Lilly's own authority acknowledges that "a specific allegation as to the source of such knowledge" takes the case outside the scope of the rule. *Omobude v. Merck & Co.*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27006 at \*6-7 (S.D. Miss. 2003).

Here, the complaint lists and discusses a number of studies and reports in the medical literature, as well as governmental and health organizational advisories, appearing as early as 1996 and continuing through the 2005 Physician's Desk Reference. According to the descriptions provided in the complaint, these documents support and even warn of a link between Zyprexa (and the family of atypical antipsychotic drugs to which it belongs) and diabetes, pancreatitis and hyperglycemia. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14-23). Because it contains "a specific allegation as to the source [other than the manufacturer] of" the physician's actual or constructive awareness of the risks of which he failed to warn, the complaint does not negate the existence of a duty to warn.

### C. Conclusory Allegations.

"Although the Fifth Circuit has not drawn a bright-line distinction between a reasonable possibility and a theoretical one, it has held that, when plaintiffs make general allegations and fail to support them with specific, underlying facts, they have not established a reasonable basis for the Court to predict that relief may be granted." *Staples v. Merck & Co.*, 270 F. Supp. 2d 833, 837 (N.D. Tex. 2003). Lilly argues that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim makes only general allegations without specific underlying facts and thus lacks a reasonable possibility of success under this principle. (Doc. 1 at 9-10).

Assuming without deciding that application of the quoted rule is appropriate,<sup>18</sup> it does not

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<sup>18</sup>It is not clear that the Fifth Circuit has in fact embraced the quoted rule. The *Staples* Court cited two cases for the proposition, but neither seems to support the expansive sweep

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aid Lilly's case. Lilly argues the allegation that the physician "knew or should have known that the drug was unreasonably dangerous and/or would cause injury to Plaintiff" is conclusory but, as discussed in Part II.B, the complaint specifies in great detail the available medical, governmental and non-governmental information on which the physician's alleged actual or constructive knowledge is based. Lilly argues the allegation that the physician "never alerted Plaintiff to the possible dangers or advised Plaintiff to monitor blood sugars or undergo any examination, and/or diagnostic testing to determine if Plaintiff had sustained injuries" is conclusory but, as the plaintiff surely possesses personal knowledge of what her physician did and did not tell her, it is difficult to imagine what additional detail could be required to confirm that she has a basis for making the allegation. It is thus unsurprising that Lilly has been unable to suggest a single missing "underlying fact."

In short, Lilly plainly has not met its burden of showing that the resident physician was fraudulently joined. Thus, complete diversity is lacking and the case is due to be remanded.

#### CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Lilly's motion to stay is **denied** and the plaintiff's motion to remand is **granted**. This case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Monroe County.

DONE and ORDERED this 5<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

urged by Lilly. The Court in *Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.*, 224 F.3d 382 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000), noted that "Plaintiff's conspiracy allegations are completely general," *id.* at 391, but the Court grounded its conclusion of fraudulent joinder on the plaintiff's failure to present evidence in response to the resident defendants' affidavits denying their participation in a conspiracy. *Id.* at 393. The Court in *Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.*, 313 F.3d 305 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), held only that, "considering the constraints on claims by individuals peripheral to a legal relationship between other parties [in *Great Plains*, a suit by debenture holders against the issuer's financial advisor], we conclude that plaintiffs must plead facts that, viewed favorably, demonstrate that they fall within the circumscribed class of individuals eligible to bring a claim." *Id.* at 329. Because the plaintiff had direct dealings with her physician, she is not captured by the *Great Plains* rule.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY A. BAILEY, )  
                        )  
Plaintiff,           )  
                        )  
v.                    ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0262-WS-C  
                        )  
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, et al., )  
                        )  
Defendants.           )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") to stay all proceedings, (Doc. 4), and on the plaintiff's motion to remand. (Doc. 11). For the reasons set forth in the Court's order resolving the parties' essentially identical motions in *Betts v. Eli Lilly and Company*, Civ. No. 06-0259-WS-B, the motion to stay is **denied** and the motion to remand is **granted**. This action is **remanded** to the Circuit Court of Mobile County.

DONE and ORDERED this 5<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION

SHARLENE ETHERIDGE, )  
                        )  
Plaintiff,            )  
                        )  
v.                     ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0260-WS-M  
                        )  
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, et al., )  
                        )  
Defendants.           )

**ORDER**

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") to stay all proceedings, (Doc. 4), and on the plaintiff's motion to remand. (Doc. 10). For the reasons set forth in the Court's order resolving the parties' essentially identical motions in *Betts v. Eli Lilly and Company*, Civ. No. 06-0259-WS-B, the motion to stay is **denied** and the motion to remand is **granted**. This action is **remanded** to the Circuit Court of Wilcox County.

DONE and ORDERED this 5<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JANET BECK, )  
                  )  
Plaintiff,     )  
                  )  
v.               ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0263-WS-C  
                  )  
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, et al.,     )  
                  )  
Defendants.     )

**ORDER**

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”) to stay all proceedings, (Doc. 4), and on the plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. 9). For the reasons set forth in the Court’s order resolving the parties’ essentially identical motions in *Betts v. Eli Lilly and Company*, Civ. No. 06-0259-WS-B, the motion to stay is **denied** and the motion to remand is **granted**. This action is **remanded** to the Circuit Court of Mobile County.

DONE and ORDERED this 5<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION**

ORDERICK VINCENT, )  
                        )  
Plaintiff,           )  
                        )  
v.                     ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0264-WS-B  
                        )  
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, et al., )  
                        )  
Defendants.           )

**ORDER**

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") to stay all proceedings, (Doc. 4), and on the plaintiff's motion to remand. (Doc. 13). For the reasons set forth in the Court's order resolving the parties' essentially identical motions in *Betts v. Eli Lilly and Company*, Civ. No. 06-0259-WS-B, the motion to stay is **denied** and the motion to remand is **granted**. This action is **remanded** to the Circuit Court of Dallas County.

DONE and ORDERED this 5<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE